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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Samantha Nicole Cook appeals from the withheld judgment entered upon her
guilty plea to possession of heroin and possession of paraphernalia.
On appeal Cook argues the district court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress. On appeal Cook argues that State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96, 356 P.3d 389 (Ct.
App. 2015), was manifestly wrong and should be overturned.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Shortly after midnight Deputy Jacobson observed a white Honda Accord without
a front or back license plate. (1/20/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 17 – p. 10, L. 11.) Deputy Jacobson
turned around and followed the white Honda Accord. (Id.) He did not see a temporary
permit. (Id.) After Deputy Jacobson saw the white Honda Accord cross the white fog
line, Deputy Jacobson got closer and activated his overhead lights. (1/20/17 Tr., p. 10, L.
12 – p. 14, L. 12.) As they were slowing and almost stopped, Deputy Jacobson observed
a piece of paper in the rear window. (Id.) However, Deputy Jacobson could still not read
the piece of paper. (Id.) When they stopped and Deputy Jacobson approached the parked
vehicle he could make out that the paper was a registration but still could not tell the date
of expiration or any other details. (Id.) There was a large amount of condensation all
over the windows. (Id.)
Deputy Jacobson contacted Cook who was the driver of the white Honda Accord.
(R., pp. 10-12.) Cook appeared unusually nervous and Deputy Jacobson could smell the
odor of marijuana. (Id.) Cook admitted to smoking marijuana in the car. (Id.) Pursuant
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to a search of the car Deputy Jacobson found heroin, methamphetamine and
paraphernalia. (Id.) Deputy Jacobson placed Cook under arrest. (Id.) Deputy Jacobson
then found methamphetamine in Cook’s jacket pocket. (Id.) Prior to being booked into
jail, the police found paraphernalia in Cook’s bra along with four unopened suboxone
strips.

(Id.)

The state charged Cook with possession of heroin, possession of

methamphetamine, possession of suboxone, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R.,
pp. 50-52.)
Cook filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp. 53-54, 75-81.) The state responded.
(R., pp. 65-74, 108-117.) The district court held a hearing. (R., pp. 118-121.) Deputy
Jacobson testified that Cook’s car did not have a front or back license plate and he could
not see a temporary permit in the window or in the rear license plate area. (1/20/17 Tr., p.
7, L. 17 – p. 10, L. 11.) Eventually after they were stopped, Deputy Jacobson had to wipe
away the condensation before he could read the temporary permit. (1/20/17 Tr., p. 12, L.
18 – p. 14, L. 12.)
The parties stipulated to the admission of Deputy Jacobson’s car mounted video.
(1/20/17 Tr., p. 5, L. 4 – p. 6, L. 11; Ex. 1.) Deputy Jacobson testified that because of the
poor video quality it was hard to tell when the car crossed the white fog lines. (1/20/17
Tr., p. 22, Ls. 13-22.) The district court took the matter under advisement. (R., pp. 118121.)
The district court issued its decision on the record. (R., p. 122.) The district court
denied Cook’s motion to suppress. (R., pp. 123-124; 1/24/17 Tr., p. 51, L. 14 – p. 60, L.
7.) The court first determined that the state did not prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Cook’s vehicle crossed the white fog line. (1/24/17 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 2-17.)
2

The court also found that even if Cook had driven over the fog line it would not constitute
a reasonable basis for a traffic stop. (See 1/24/17 Tr., p. 52, L. 18 – p. 54, L. 13) (the
court “finds that a stop predicated on the defendant’s alleged driving over the line by a
couple of inches would, by itself, be an unreasonable seizure of the defendant and
violative of the Fourth Amendment.”)
The district court then turned to the issue of the lack of license plate and the
temporary registration. (See 1/24/17 Tr., p. 54, L. 14 – p. 60, L. 5.) The district court
found that Deputy Jacobson did not see the temporary registration until after his
emergency lights were on. (1/24/17 Tr., p. 54, L. 14 – p. 55, L. 5.) Further, Deputy
Jacobson could not read the temporary registration until he wiped the heavy condensation
off of the window. (Id.)
That takes us to the other reason for the stop, the lack of license plate or
the lack – seeing the temporary registration. The Court finds the following facts:
That the deputy did not see the temporary registration on the white Honda Accord
until he came up on the vehicle after putting on his emergency lights. As he – he
states as he was slowing down almost stopped, he saw the temporary registration.
The square of the temporary plate/paper, temporary registration, is visible
from the video and is – what is printed on the temporary plate or the temporary
registration form is not visible.
The deputy stated that he had to wipe off a heavy condensation off the
outside of the window in order to read the registration which was found to be
valid until the end of November, the stop having taken place October 29, 2016.
(1/24/17 Tr., p. 54, L. 14 – p. 55, L. 5.) The district court reviewed the holdings in both
State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 160 P.3d 1279 (Ct. App. 2007), and State v. Kinch, 159
Idaho 96, 356 P.3d 389 (Ct. App. 2015), and the language of Idaho Code § 49-432(4).
(See 1/24/17 Tr., p. 54, L. 14 – p. 60, L. 5.) Idaho Code § 49-432(4) requires, among
other things, that a temporary permit must be “readily legible.” (See id.)

The district

court found that Cook’s temporary registration was not “readily legible” as required by
3

the applicable law and thus the stop was based upon reasonable articulable suspicion.
(See id.)
Cook filed a motion to reconsider arguing the statute was unconstitutionally
vague. (R., pp. 130-132.) The district court denied the motion to reconsider. (R., pp.
135-137; See 3/10/17 Tr., p. 5, L. 24 – p. 6, L. 7.) Cook pled guilty to possession of
heroin and possession of drug paraphernalia, and in exchange the state dismissed the two
remaining counts. (R., pp. 138-139, 141-143, 145-146.) Cook reserved her right to
appeal. (R., pp. 145-146.) The district court entered a withheld judgment and placed
Cook on supervised probation for two years. (R., pp. 153-160.) Cook timely appealed.
(R., pp. 161-164.)

4

ISSUE
Cook states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Cook’s motion to suppress and
motion to reconsider?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Cook failed to show the district court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress and motion to reconsider?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Cook’s Motion To Suppress And Motion
To Reconsider
A.

Introduction
The district court found that Cook’s temporary permit was not “readily legible” as

required by Idaho Code § 49-432(4) and denied Cook’s motion to suppress. (See 1/24/17
Tr., p. 54, L. 14 – p. 60, L. 5.) On appeal Cook argues the district court erred when it
relied upon the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Kinch, 159 Idaho 96, 356 P.3d 389
(Ct. App. 2015). (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-15.) Cook argues that Kinch should be
overruled because she claims, contrary to the holding in Kinch, that “readily legible” does
not mean “readily legible” from the vantage point of another vehicle. (See id.) Cook’s
argument fails. Kinch is supported by the plain language of Idaho Code § 49-432(4).
The plain language of Idaho Code § 49-432(4) requires a temporary permit to be readily
legible while the vehicle is being operated on the highways of the state of Idaho. See I.C.
§ 49-432(4). Cook fails to show Kinch was manifestly wrong.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court

applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 302 P.3d 328
(2012) (citing State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)). The
appellate court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous but will freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to
the facts found. Id.
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C.

The District Court Properly Found That Cook’s Temporary Permit Was Not
“Readily Legible” As Required By Idaho Code § 49-432(4)
“A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and

implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be
based on probable cause to be reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500
(1983); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).
However, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are
permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person
has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498; Bishop, 146
Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210. “An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate
possible criminal behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is
being driven contrary to traffic laws.” Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)). Whether an officer possessed reasonable
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or
before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210; State v. Sheldon,
139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
Idaho law requires that a motor vehicle be registered and display license plates
when it is being operated on the highways of the state. See I.C. § 49-456(1). One
exception to the license plate requirement is a display of a temporary permit which has to
be displayed “at all times while the vehicle is being operated on the highway.” I.C. § 49432(4).
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(4) A temporary permit shall be in a form, and issued under rules adopted by the
board, and shall be displayed at all times while the vehicle is being operated on
the highways by posting the permit upon the windshield of each vehicle or in
another prominent place, where it may be readily legible.
I.C. § 49-432(4). Here, Cook did not have a front or rear license plate. (See 1/20/17 Tr.,
p. 7, L. 17 – p. 10, L. 11.) Nor could Deputy Jacobson see a temporary permit. (See
1/20/17 Tr., p. 12, L. 18 – p. 14, L. 12.) Only after the stop had been initiated could
Deputy Jacobson see a piece of paper in the back window. (See id.) Even after upon
approaching Cook’s car on foot, Deputy Jacobson could not read the temporary permit.
(See id.) Deputy Jacobson had to wipe Cook’s windshield in order to actually read the
temporary permit. (See id.)
The district court found that Cook’s temporary permit failed to comply with Idaho
Code § 49-432(4) because it was not “readily legible” and thus Deputy Jacobson had
reasonable articulable suspicion for the traffic stop. (See 1/24/17 Tr., p. 54, L. 14 – p. 60,
L. 5.) The district court properly denied Cook’s motion to suppress.
1.

Cook Has Failed To Show That Kinch Was Wrongly Decided And Should
Be Overruled

In Kinch, the Idaho Court of Appeals analyzed the plain language and the context
of Idaho Code § 49-432(4) and held that a temporary permit must be “readily legible from
the vantage point of another vehicle on the road[.]” Kinch, 159 Idaho at 100, 356 P.3d at
393. Cook argues for the first time on appeal that Kinch should be overruled. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-15.) Cook has failed to show Kinch was manifestly wrong and
has to be overturned.
“Stare decisis requires that this Court follows controlling precedent unless that
precedent is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling
8

that precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice.” State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4-5, 343 P.3d 30, 33-34 (2015) (citing
State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 287, 297 P.3d 244, 250 (2013)).

The Court “will

ordinarily not overrule one of [its] prior opinions unless it is shown to have been
manifestly wrong, or the holding in the case has proven over time to be unwise or unjust.”
State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012) (citations omitted); see also
State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) (“[P]rior decisions of
this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be
unjust or unwise.”). Cook fails to show Kinch was manifestly wrong and should be
overturned.
An officer stopped Kinch after observing that Kinch’s vehicle did not have any
license plates. Kinch, 159 Idaho at 97, 356 P.3d at 390. Kinch had posted a temporary
permit in the top left corner of the vehicle’s back window, however the officer could not
read the permit. Id. The permit was bent, somewhat crumbled, and covered by a layer of
condensation. Id.
The officer asked Kinch if he had anything illegal in the vehicle and Kinch
admitted to having a pipe. Id. at 97-98, 356 P.3d at 390-391. The officer seized the pipe.
Id. Subsequent testing showed the presence of methamphetamine in the pipe and the state
charged Kinch with possession of methamphetamine.

Id. Kinch filed a motion to

suppress arguing that the permit was readily legible and thus the officer did not have
reasonable articulable suspicion for the traffic stop. See id. The district court denied the
motion to suppress.

Id.

The district court also denied Kinch’s motion for

reconsideration. Id. After a conditional guilty plea, Kinch appealed. Id. On appeal
9

Kinch argued, in part, that Idaho Code § 49-432(4) only required that a temporary permit
be “readily legible” upon a “closer inspection” and that it need not be legible from the
vantage point of another vehicle. Id. at 99-100, 356 P.3d at 392-393.
The Idaho Court of Appeals examined the plain language of Idaho Code § 49432(4), construed the statute as a whole, and rejected Kinch’s argument. See id. at 100,
356 P.3d at 393. The Idaho Court of Appeals used the correct analytical framework to
examine the statute. “The interpretation of a statute ‘must begin with the literal words of
the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the
statute must be construed as a whole.’” Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139
Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)). “‘If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.’” Id.
Idaho Code § 49-432(4) applies “at all times while the vehicle is being operated
on the highways.” Id. Thus the plain language of the statute requires the permit be
readily legible while the vehicle is being driven. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals
reasoned:
Conversely, I.C. § 49–432(4) provides that the temporary permit must be
displayed in a prominent place so as to be “readily legible.” This shows an intent
by the legislature that, unlike applications for specialty plates, temporary permits
must be visible (indeed, readily legible) while displayed on a vehicle. Moreover,
as noted by the state, the readily legible requirement for posting a temporary
permit applies “at all times while the vehicle is being operated on the highways.”
Kinch’s argument that a temporary permit need only be readily legible upon closer
inspection, such as when one is right next to the vehicle while it is stopped,
ignores the plain language of the statute requiring that the permit be readily
legible while the vehicle is being driven. Thus, although the statute does not
explicitly provide that the temporary permit must be readily legible from the
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vantage point of another vehicle on the road, the context of the statute and its
plain language make that implication clear.
Id. (internal citation omitted). In addition to the plain language and context of the statute,
the Idaho Court of Appeals also supported its conclusion by comparing Idaho Code § 49432(4) to other statutes. See id. at 100-101, 356 P.3d at 393-394.
Kinch also argued that if the Idaho legislature wanted the temporary permit to be
readily legible from the vantage point of another vehicle the legislature would have use
the word “readable” instead of “legible.” See id. The Idaho Court of Appeals analyzed
the dictionary definition of “legible” and found that “legible” is a synonym for
“readable.” See id. In addition, the Court recognized that the statute’s use of the adverb
“readily” shows that the temporary permit must “not merely be visible, but easily
readable—an addition only necessary if viewing the temporary registration permit from
some distance away.” Id. Thus, based upon the plain language of the statute, the entirety
of the statute, and the dictionary definition of the words used in the statute, the Idaho
Court of Appeals rejected Kinch’s argument. See id.
Now, on this appeal, Cook essentially reiterates Kinch’s arguments and argues
that the statutory requirement that the temporary permit be “readily legible” does not
include being “readily legible” from the vantage point of another vehicle.

(See

Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-15.) Cook argues that Kinch is manifestly wrong. (See id.)
Cook fails to show the Court of Appeals decision in Kinch is manifestly wrong.
Cook’s argument fails to adequately address the plain language of the entire
statute which requires that the temporary permit be displayed at all times while the
vehicle is being operated on the highways. See I.C. § 49-432(4). The Idaho Court of
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Appeals correctly noted that the context and plain language of the statute put the “readily
legible” requirement during the time when the vehicle is being operated on the highways.
See Kinch, 159 Idaho at 100, 356 P.3d at 393. Thus, “readily legible” has to apply from
the vantage point of another vehicle, because it would be impossible to read the
temporary permit from a closer vantage point while the vehicle is in motion on the
highway.

Cook’s interpretation of “readily legible” ignores the “operated on the

highways” language.
Instead of directly addressing the vehicle operation language, Cook instead argues
that there actually is no requirement that the temporary permit be “readily legible” at any
time. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 14 (“While the statute mandates that the driver display
the permit at all times (‘shall be displayed’), it does not mandate the permit be readily
legible at all times.”) Cook’s “may” argument is misplaced. Here, “may” does not mean
the “readily legible” requirement is optional. The plain language of the statute requires
that the temporary permit “shall be displayed at all times while the vehicle is being
operated on the highways by posting the permit upon the windshield of each vehicle or in
another prominent place, where it may be readily legible.” I.C. § 49-432(4). The “may”
language does not refer to permissiveness of the legibility, but rather to the possibility of
another person reading the temporary permit.

The plain language of the statute

recognizes that the temporary permit must be readily legible to anyone who may decide to
read it.
Cook’s definitional argument likewise fails. Cook argues that Kinch is manifestly
wrong because “legibility”, “readability” and “visibility” can have slightly different
meanings. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-15.) Cook argues, “Readable demands that the
12

text is not only legible, but also immediately able to be interpreted and understood. In
contrast, legibility demands only the capacity or possibility of being read. It is not a
guarantee of readability at all times.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) Cook’s definitional
argument fails to show that Kinch is manifestly wrong because it fails to show any error
in any of the Court of Appeals’ definitional citations. (See id.) A disagreement about
which dictionary definition to use does not rise to a manifest error. Further, Cook’s
definitional argument is not an interpretation of the plain language of the statute. Instead
it is an interpretation of words the legislature could have used. Cook’s argument also
fails because, the adverb “readily” modifies the term “legible” which is a guarantee that
the permit has to be readable at all times, which would include while the vehicle is in
operation. Cook has failed to show that Kinch was manifestly wrong and should be
overturned.
2.

Cook’s Temporary Permit Was Not Readily Legible And She Fails To
Distinguish Kinch

Cook argues that the district court erred because her permit was actually “readily
legible.” (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-17.) Cook argues that the permit in Kinch was
“bent, somewhat crumpled, and obscured by a layer of condensation” whereas her permit
was only obscured by a layer of condensation. (See id.) Cook’s argument fails because a
layer of condensation still prevents the temporary permit from being “readily legible”
regardless whether the permit is also bent.
The district court’s factual findings show that Cook’s temporary permit was not
“readily legible.”

The district court found that Deputy Jacobson could not see the

temporary permit until the emergency lights were activated, and Deputy Jacobson could
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not read what was on the permit. (1/24/17 Tr., p. 54, L. 14 – p. 55, L. 5.) It was only
after Deputy Jacobson was out of his car, and wiped away the condensation did the permit
become legible. (See id.)
That takes us to the other reason for the stop, the lack of license plate or
the lack – seeing the temporary registration. The Court finds the following facts:
That the deputy did not see the temporary registration on the white Honda Accord
until he came up on the vehicle after putting on his emergency lights. As he – he
states as he was slowing down almost stopped, he saw the temporary registration.
The square of the temporary plate/paper, temporary registration, is visible
from the video and is – what is printed on the temporary plate or the temporary
registration form is not visible.
The deputy stated that he had to wipe off a heavy condensation off the
outside of the window in order to read the registration which was found to be
valid until the end of November, the stop having taken place October 29, 2016.
(1/24/17 Tr., p. 54, L. 14 – p. 55, L. 5.) Cook has failed to show the district court erred
when it determined that her temporary permit was not “readily legible.”
3.

Cook Fails To Show The Stop Was Unconstitutionally Prolonged

Cook argues that the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged because once Deputy
Jacobson saw the permit in the window there was no longer any legal justification for the
stop and Deputy Jacobson had to immediately cease the traffic stop. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 17-19.) Cook did not raise this issue regarding an unconstitutionally prolonged
stop before the district court. (See R., pp. 53-54, 75-81, 130-132; 1/20/17 Tr., p. 39, L. 7
– p. 47, L. 6.) Since this issue was not raised below it is not preserved for appeal. State
v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, ___, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (citations omitted)
(“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties
will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.”) Even if
this Court address the merits of this argument on appeal, Cook’s argument fails.
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Cook argues that “[o]nce Deputy Jacobsen shined his flashlight on Ms. Cook’s
rear window just prior to initiating contact with her, Deputy Jacobsen no longer had any
authority for the seizure.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 18.) Cook’s argument is unsupported by
the record in this matter and the applicable law.
Cook relies, in part, upon State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 160 P.3d 1279 (Ct. App.
2007). (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-19.) Salois does not control the outcome here. The
Idaho Court of Appeals clarified Salois, and held that the reasoning in Salois is not
applicable when there is an “obvious and discernable” violation of the statute prior to the
stop. See State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 38 n.1, 218 P.3d 10, 17 n .1 (Ct. App. 2009).
Here, there was an “obvious and discernable” violation of the statute prior to the stop
because Deputy Jacobson could not even see the permit until after the stop had been
initiated, and could not read the writing on the permit until after he had wiped away the
condensation from the windshield.
Contrary to Cook’s argument, the record in this case shows that the temporary
permit was not “readily legible” until after Deputy Jacobson wiped away the
condensation – which occurred after he made initial contact with Cook. (See 1/24/17 Tr.,
p. 54, L. 14 – p. 55, L. 5; see also Ex. 1 at approximately 1:05 – 4:05.) Only after wiping
away the condensation was Deputy Jacobson able to read the temporary permit and check
its validity. (See id.) Thus, the record does not support Cook’s argument that the
temporary permit was readily legible before Deputy Jacobson made initial contact with
Cook.
Further, if an officer stops a vehicle for failing to have a license plate, but upon
effectuating the stop, sees the temporary permit, the officer can still make lawful contact
15

with the driver. See State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503, 927 P.2d 893 (Ct. App. 1996) (“After
having made a lawful stop to determine whether Reed’s vehicle was registered, Officer
Rouse was entitled to ascertain the driver’s identity even though the reason for that stop
had dissipated.”); see also State v. Haldane, 300 P.3d 657, 664 (Mont. 2013) (traffic stop
because driver’s license plate was obscured by snow and a ball hitch, and Court held, that
“even if the officers could see the license plate when they approached the vehicle and
changed their vantage point, the officers still had the right to speak to the driver and
request certain documentation.”) Contrary to Cook’s argument on appeal, the holding in
Reed does not run afoul of Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015).
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19.) In Rodriguez the United States Supreme Court held
“the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the
seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to
related safety concerns[.]” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (citations omitted). “Because
addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Id. (citation omitted). “Authority for the seizure
thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” Id. (citations omitted). “Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic
ticket, an officer’s mission includes “‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’”
Id. at 1615. “Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s
registration and proof of insurance.” Id. (citations omitted). “These checks serve the
same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are
operated safely and responsibly.” Id. (citations omitted).
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Here, the purpose of the stop was to investigate Cook’s failure to have a license
plate or readily legible temporary permit. The district court found that Deputy Jacobson
could not even see the existence of the temporary permit until the traffic stop had already
been initiated and could not read it until he had removed a layer of condensation from the
windshield. (1/24/17 Tr., p. 54, L. 14 – p. 55, L. 5.) Deputy Jacobson got out of his car
and made contact with Cook. (See Ex. 1 at approximately 1:05 – 4:05.) During this
initial encounter Deputy Jacobson engaged in the ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic
stop, such as inquiring about Cook’s license and registration. (See id.) Nothing in
Rodriguez holds that this type of ordinary inquiry is unconstitutional. Rodriquez holds
the opposite, during a traffic stop these are the type of contact and questions that an
officer is supposed to perform. The holding in Rodriguez is not incompatible with the
holding in Reed.
In addition to the record and the law not supporting Cook’s argument, public
policy also does not support Cook’s argument. If Cook’s argument is accepted, it would
lead to bizarre and confusing interactions between the police and the public. If a driver is
pulled over by a police officer, but then the police officer, inexplicably, and without
explanation or contact, simply left, the driver would be left confused and bewildered.
Likely the driver would believe they are being needlessly harassed by the police. Rather
it is far better practice that, even if the investigation shows no offense before the officer
makes contact with the driver, the officer, like the officer in Reed, should still make
contact, explain the situation and engage in the constitutionally permissible inquiries
regarding driver’s license, etc. Cook has failed to show the stop was unconstitutionally
prolonged.
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4.

Cook Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Declined To
Rule Idaho Code § 49-432(4) Unconstitutionally Vague

Cook fails to show that § 49-432(4) is unconstitutionally vague. Whether a statute
is unconstitutional is purely a question of law, therefore, the appellate court considers the
trial court’s ruling de novo. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 969 P.2d 244 (1998) (citing
State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho 927, 930, 877 P.2d 898, 901 (1994); Sun Valley Co. v. City of
Sun Valley, 109 Idaho 424, 428, 708 P.2d 147, 151 (1985)).

“There is a strong

presumption of the validity of an ordinance, and an appellate court is obligated to seek an
interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality.” Id. (citations omitted). A
statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical interpretation can be given
it. Id. (citing City of Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347, 351, 303 P.2d 680, 682
(1956)).
Here, the district court did not explicitly rule on Cook’s motion that Idaho Code
§ 49-432(4) is unconstitutionally vague. (See R., pp. 53-54, 75-81, 130-132; 1/24/17 Tr.,
p. 51, L. 14 – p. 60, L. 5; 3/10/17 Tr., p. 4, L. 4 – p. 6, L. 7.) Where a district court fails
to rule on a motion, the appellate court presumes the district court denied the motion.
State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 61, 343 P.3d 497, 503 (2015). Idaho Code § 49-432(4) is
not void for vagueness.
In determining whether a statute is void for vagueness the court must first ask
whether it regulates constitutionally protected conduct. State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584, 587588, 798 P.2d 43, 46-47 (1990). Cook does not argue, nor could she establish, that Idaho
Code § 49-432(4) regulates constitutionally protected conduct. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp. 19-22.) Since the statute does not regulate constitutionally protected conduct the
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“next and last step is to ask whether (a) the ordinance gives notice to those who are
subject to it, and (b) whether the ordinance contains guidelines and imposes sufficient
discretion on those who must enforce the ordinance.” Bitt, 118 Idaho at 588, 798 P.2d at
47.
The United States Supreme Court has explained that “[a] conviction or
punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is
obtained ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
enforcement.’”

F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012)

(quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). Statutes have a “strong
presumption of validity” and the court must, if it can, “construe, not condemn” them.
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 403 (2010) (internal quotes and cites omitted).
That “close cases can be envisioned” is insufficient to “render[] a statute vague” because
the state must still prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285, 305-306 (2008).

Even if a statute’s “outermost boundaries” are

“imprecise,” such uncertainty has “little relevance” if the “appellant’s conduct falls
squarely within the ‘hard core’ of the statute’s proscriptions.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973); see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 411 (citing Broadrick).
Furthermore, sufficient clarity “may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise
uncertain statute.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). “‘One to whose
conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.’”
Alcohol Beverage Control v. Boyd, 148 Idaho 944, 949, 231 P.3d 1041, 1046 (2010)
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(quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495
n. 7 (1982) (internal quote omitted)).
“In order to determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague, the statute
should not be evaluated in the abstract, but should be considered in reference to the
particular conduct of the defendant challenging the statute.” State v. Hansen, 125 Idaho
927, 932, 877 P.2d 898, 903 (1994) (citing State v. Marek, 112 Idaho 860, 866, 736 P.2d
1314, 1320 (1987); State v. Carringer, 95 Idaho 929, 930, 523 P.2d 532, 533 (1974)).
Thus, “the void-for-vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2)
arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions.” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412 (2010) (citing
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). Here, Cook fails to establish that I.C.
§ 49-432(4) is unconstitutionally vague because she has failed to show either that: 1) the
statute did not give her fair notice of the prohibited conduct; or 2) the statute grants
unlimited discretion to police.
Cook argues that Idaho Code § 49-432(4) does not give her fair notice “because it
does not give fair notice that an uncontrollable weather condition will render a valid
permit invalid and cause the driver to violate the law.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-21.)
Cook’s argument is misplaced because it actually does not address the language of the
statute. Idaho Code § 49-432(4) requires that while a vehicle is being operated on a
highway that the temporary permit be “displayed at all times” where it may be “readily
legible.” See I.C. § 49-432(4).
(4) A temporary permit shall be in a form, and issued under rules adopted by the
board, and shall be displayed at all times while the vehicle is being operated on
the highways by posting the permit upon the windshield of each vehicle or in
another prominent place, where it may be readily legible.
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I.C. § 49-432(4).
Thus, a driver is on fair notice that a temporary permit must be readily legible
while the vehicle is being operated. The statute gives fair notice that anything, even
weather conditions, that may render a permit not readily legible may be a violation of the
statute. Contrary to Cook’s argument, external weather conditions do not render the
language of a statute void for vagueness.
Contrary to Cook’s argument, weather conditions often make a driving behavior,
that would be legal in different weather conditions, illegal.

For example, it is not

uncommon for what would be legal speed or driving behavior to be illegal depending on
external weather conditions. See e.g. I.C. § 49-654 (1) (“No person shall drive a vehicle
at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard
to the actual and potential hazards then existing.”); I.C. § 49-141(3) (“Inattentive driving
shall be considered a lesser offense than reckless driving and shall be applicable in those
circumstances where the conduct of the operator has been inattentive, careless or
imprudent, in light of the circumstances then existing[.]”) More precisely, external
weather events, like snow, which block the legibility of license plates can create
reasonable articulable suspicion that a violation regarding the legibility of license plates
has occurred. See Haldane, 300 P.3d at 664 (holding that a license plate obscured by
snow and a ball hitch can provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop);
Commonwealth v. Wilbert, 858 A.2d 1247, 1249 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (a license plate
that is obscured by mud such that an officer can read the numbers when close to the car,
but not when following approximately four lengths behind, provides probable cause to
suspect a violation); see also State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 872, 172 P.3d 1146,
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1147 (Ct. App. 2007) (officers initiated a traffic stop because driver’s windshield was
cracked and his license plate was covered with snow; however issue on appeal did not
address basis for traffic stop).
While intervening weather events may have rendered illegible what Cook thought
was a legible permit, Cook still had notice that she was required to post a readily legible
permit.
Nor does Idaho Code § 49-432(4) grant unlimited discretion to police. Cook
argues that a “violation of this traffic law is vested solely in the officer’s discretion and
whether he or she, subjectively at the time, could see the permit in the rain.” (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 21-22.) It is not clear how an officer’s inability to readily read a
temporary permit gives the officer unlimited discretion. Either the officer can readily
read the permit, in which case it is legal, or the officer cannot, in which case he has
reasonable suspicion that the permit is not legal. This is the same with any traffic
violation. Either the officer sees the violation or does not. This statute does not provide
unlimited discretion to the police.

Cook has failed to show this statute is

unconstitutionally vague.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 8th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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